Friday, May 15, 2009

SKF

I bought into this reverse ETF at $56.60 and it's now trading much lower. I realised that while the idea was right, I didn't quite understand how price movement of the ETF in relation to the price movement of the underlying (aka Delta). I don't have faith in a US recovery, in fact, I think they are pretty much headed for the gutters with the amount of money they are printing. Not letting the banks fail is pretty much like putting a band aid over a festering wound. Before you know it, the band aid will be soaked with puss and the wound will turn septic - and that's when the real pain will come.

Honestly, I underestimated the effect of public perception and investor confidence. Sure, ultimately, fundamentals rule. But in the short and medium term, I'm at the mercy of market sentiment.

Anyway, with investors moving back into emerging markets, will we see some kind of rally in prices as funds establish positions and create their portfolios? Or is the recent rally attributable to this? If so, are current price levels sustainable? Also, what are the opportunities in emerging markets? Commodities? If so, will this lead to a run up in commodity prices? Again, will this run up be temporary?

I always thought that institutional investing was pretty flawed. Fund manager performances are benchmarked against their peers. It's like how Moody's can't have ratings that vary significantly from say... Standard and Poor's. Because it'll highlight something fundamentally wrong in their methodologies. Inevitably, as smart as they all are, they tend to put their money on the same asset class. So, if the "smart money" starts flowing into the emerging markets, where then should we, as retail investors put our money to benefit from a possible short run supply shortage in emerging market asset classes?

Maybe I sound incoherent. That's probably because it's late, and I'm trying to keep myself up to answer a call. Bear with me, I'll clean this up tmr or whenever I feel like my brain is actually working.

Peace. 4:09am. Daniel - OUT

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Tuesday, April 14, 2009

A contrarian...

Dr. Marc Faber concluded his monthly bulletin (June 2008) with the following:

"The federal government is sending each of us a $600 rebate. If we spend that money at Wal-Mart, the money goes to China. If we spend it on gasoline it goes to the Arabs. If we buy a computer/Software it will go to India. If we purchase fruit and vegetables it will go to Mexico, Honduras and Guatemala. If we purchase a good car it will go to Germany. If we purchase useless crap it will go to Taiwan and none of it will help the American economy. The only way to keep that money here at home is to spend it on prostitutes and beer, since these are the only products still produced in US. I've been doing my part."

Good man! Erm.. I mean... interesting point of view... erm.. yeah.. =)

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Wednesday, January 21, 2009

High level thinking...

If girls are depreciating assets, shouldn't we settle for one with high salvage value? Hmmm..

Today, someone joked about doing a deal for Hotel 81 and/or Fragrance. So, if we were doing a comp analysis, what metrics should we use? A smartass said "Penetration rate." I couldn't stop laughing.

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Friday, January 2, 2009

Bruce Wasserstein Speaks...

An interesting take on M&As by one of the biggest names around.

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M&A and Tax

Thought this article was quite interesting. Maybe some food for thought. Got it off BTOnline. *All credit goes to the smarts behind the article*

Business Times - 01 Jan 2009

Ease tax rules to boost M&A activity

Singapore should look to reform existing rules and allow tax deduction for interest costs to attract more deals
By CHRIS WOO AND LIM CHIN CHIN

MERGER and acquisition (M&A) activities have overall ebbed in 2008 with credit constraints, volatile equity markets and weak confidence.

Against this negative backdrop, there are still some positive sentiments that will limit the fall in M&A activities in the coming year. Valuations are going down by the day. Strategic buyers and cash-rich companies have the opportunities to cherry-pick quality assets which are at distressed levels and shall emerge from this crisis with stronger balance sheets.

In times like this, Singapore will need more creative reform that will foster new growth areas to maintain its competitiveness as an international financial hub in Asia. Based on the 2008 Index of Economic Freedom by the US-based Heritage Foundation, Singapore was ranked second after Hong Kong in terms of economic freedom.

Today, Singapore is already a preferred country to set up regional operations due to its low tax rates, wide tax treaty network and tax incentives.

However, a particular point for M&A players intending to acquire a Singapore target or use Singapore to host an acquisition vehicle is the tax impact relating to any interest cost. Currently, interest costs on borrowings used to acquire shares are not tax-deductible. This is so given that dividend income is exempt from tax and, therefore, interest costs attributable to the exempt dividend income shall have no tax benefit.

It is not uncommon for investments to be financed at least in part through borrowings and, therefore, impact on funding costs is a major factor to be considered in any investment plan. The tax impact from the non-deductibility of interest costs can be hefty and may kill the appetite for a deal.

Perhaps it is an opportune time to introduce reform to this rule. To illustrate the point, tax regimes in countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands and Australia allow some tax deduction for interest costs on borrowings used in a shares acquisition of an entity. The allowance for interest deduction, however, may be subject to certain restrictions, which may include, but may not be limited to, thin capitalisation rules and limitations on the deductibility of interest costs on related-party loans.

Listed below are the general deduction rules for interest costs in the UK, the US, the Netherlands and Australia. The general rules set out below assume the acquirer and the target are tax residents of the same country.

United Kingdom

Interest costs are generally given tax relief when they are taken to the income statements pursuant to generally accepted accounting principles in the UK. Interest costs are deductible against three forms of income: a) deductible on accrual basis against income in the same year; b) against income of the company in the previous 12 months; c) against current year profits of the other company within the same group. Any surplus of interest costs after these options have been exhausted may be carried forward to offset against future non-trading profits derived by that company.

United States

Subject to limitations, interest costs generally are deductible when paid or accrued on valid business indebtedness of the taxpayer claiming the deduction. After an acquisition in which certain ownership thresholds are met, the acquirer and the target may elect to file a consolidated US federal income tax return. A consolidated return generally results in the affiliated group of corporations being treated as a single corporation for US federal income-tax purposes. Thus, subject to applicable limitations, an acquirer's interest costs on acquisition debt may be deductible against the target's profits.

The Netherlands

Subject to limitations, interest costs incurred on genuine third-party debt are generally deductible, whereas interest paid to related parties could be restricted under certain circumstances. Under the tax consolidation rules for Dutch subsidiaries, the Dutch tax resident companies can be treated as a single taxpayer and file one tax return. Essentially, in a simple acquisition structure involving a Dutch parent company acquiring a Dutch target, the fiscal unity concept is relied on by the parent company to offset the acquisition interest costs against the Dutch target's profits. In addition, the Dutch companies should be effectively managed and controlled in the Netherlands, that is, have sufficient substance, to form a fiscal unity.

Australia

Interest costs are generally deductible in Australia, including situations in which entities are part of a tax consolidated group. Similar to the Dutch and US rules, resident group companies within a consolidated group are treated as a single entity for tax purposes. In this respect, the acquirer and the target can form a tax consolidated group and offset the acquisition interest costs against the target's profits.

Singapore should look to reform existing rules and allow tax deduction for interest costs to attract more M&A activities in Singapore. Rules as suggested below could be introduced:

Concession to allow outright deduction of acquisition interest costs against target's business profits; or make current group relief system more user-friendly. Taking the UK model as an example, the existing tax group relief provision could be widened to allow interest costs to be treated as normal business expense and be used to offset taxable income within a group; or

Where the acquiring company has other sources of taxable income, to allow interest costs to be treated as a business expense and offset against the other operating profits of the company.

To avoid companies taking advantage of the tax benefit, certain rules may be imposed. For example, thin capitalisation rules could be applied where there are related party loans.

Reform to the existing rule may not necessarily result in loss of tax revenue to Singapore. There are greater benefits to be derived from the change:

The valuation for Singapore companies could be enhanced and therefore increase stamp duty collections given the higher transaction values.

The lending business in Singapore should be enhanced. A condition may be imposed on an acquiring company that the financing must be obtained from Singapore-based banks in order to qualify for deduction of interest costs.

Singapore could be a more attractive location for setting up a holding company or regional headquarters.

In Asia, tax rules in Hong Kong, China, India and Malaysia are facing the same issue as Singapore whereby deduction for interest costs is also not available under the respective countries' tax regime.

Therefore, the reform does not only make Singapore more appealing to M&A players in Asia but could also be a step further in building Singapore into an international financial and business hub.

Chris Woo is a partner and Lim Chin Chin is a senior consultant, M&A tax team of PricewaterhouseCoopers Singapore
Copyright © 2007 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Tuesday, November 25, 2008

Waiting...

After fussing over semantics, vocabulary, grammar and stylistics, I've finally submitted my resume and cover letter to Y. I can only pray that they call me up. Today's been spent trying to get air tickets to Boston instead of driving. Bloody expensive. But given the amount of sleep that I've been having, as well as the adverse weather conditions, I think travelling by plane is a wiser thing to do - albeit more expensive. Plus, I get to study while travelling as well. Actually, that was my biggest concern.

Spent time going through DCF, Comp Companies, Recent Transactions and Replacement Costs valuation methods. Need to figure out how to describe esoteric finance terms in layman terms. It'll be a challenge. But I still have some time. Also need to find out where to get various information in doing valuation and analyses of financial statements.

I CAN DO IT! YES I CAN! YES I CAN!

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Absence

Mum and Dad. Nothing is confirmed. And God knows.. maybe they've already hired someone else. Anyway, I won't be sleeping now.. will go through some pitchbooks and review some other material. Hopefully I will be able to impress IF (and its a big IF) I get called up for a phone interview. I still want to pursue a life as an entrepreneur, but this unique internship opening is too good to let slip!

I'll disappear in my books for the next few days. No more horsing around. Call or email me ONLY if there's anything important. If not, give me some space. If I don't get the internship in the end, it's ok I guess - then Dad will have his poker khaki back. Haha..


Cheers
Daniel

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Excitement

I just found out from X that he "intensely recommended" me to someone who just got an internship with Y for the period spanning from Jan to Jul 2009. Apparently, Y is looking for an additional intern. Given the current economic conditions, this would be an extremely wonderful opportunity. I hope the space is still available, I didn't reply to that email earlier cause I was too swarmped with work.

I've spoken about Y before and I really really really love it there. I think they've got it right and have very very very good alignment of self-interests with that of their clients'. If this door should close on me, sure, other doors would open... but I'd be terribly disappointed.

Now I need to do my part and just make sure I don't screw up any interview should I be granted one. Please God. Help me this time.

100 hrs plus a week? No problem. We're only young once.

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Saturday, November 15, 2008

3 pens in 3 days...

Studying for this thing is no fun. Only time I got out of my seat today was to shit, bathe, pee, microwave my "boxed lunches" and get coffee and water. I'm passing on Portfolio Managment today... will leave it for another night. Oh well, studying for this MOFO is good for me. Over just 3 days, I've been able to reconsolidate what I've learnt over the last 2 years. Good stuff.

Saturday and Sunday will mark an intense weekend of internship applications - finally getting started. Wish myself luck. I hope I clear my applications and economics revision in time to catch the Cornell Ice Hockey match.. Keeping my fingers crossed.

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Friday, November 14, 2008

Of lessons we can learn...

I was just browsing through some Raffles Conversations articles on BTOnline when I stumbled on this very very very educational and insightful interview with Citi's William Rhodes. He spoke about the reasons behind his "pessimistic" outlook before the financial crisis surfaced, the mistakes we make time and again, actions needed as we move forward... There's a lot to learn from this! He's a wise man indeed.

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Fire Fighter

Published November 8, 2008 (BT)
By Wong Wei Kong

Two years ago, Citigroup's William Rhodes already raised the alarm about the impending sub-prime crisis. But he was considered a party-pooper, and few heeded his warning. In a bullish world, his was among the few voices urging caution. William Rhodes warned of a sub-prime crisis two years ago, but few then heeded the banker who made his name fighting economic fires around the world over three long decades. And it's something the senior vice-chairman of Citigroup recalls with some irony.

'The first time I talked publicly about the difficult economic situation we're in was here in Singapore two years ago at the IMF-World Bank meetings,' says Mr Rhodes, who is also chairman, CEO and president of Citibank, in an interview with BT here. 'At a press conference by the Institute of International Finance where I am first vice-chairman, I mentioned that I was very concerned that we were in the midst of a liquidity bubble and a major housing problem, in particular, sub-prime.

'Now you will remember that this meeting of the IMF and the World Bank was full of euphoric feelings over where the world economy was going and I didn't have much company in my concerns. The only two people I could remember who had similar concerns were Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Larry Summers, former US treasury secretary.
'One newspaper wrote that there were only three pessimists at the conference and mentioned the three of us. It's interesting that the other two are now economic advisers to Senator (now President Elect) Obama.'

The crisis fighter has seen it all happen before, having joined Citigroup in 1957. In the 1970s, he had helped Jamaica restructure its debts. He went on to build his reputation for the leading role he played in the 1980s in helping to manage the external-debt crisis that involved developing nations and their creditors worldwide. Through the 1990s, he headed the advisory committees of international banks that negotiated debt restructuring agreements for Argentina, Brazil, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.

In 1998, when South Korea experienced liquidity problems, he chaired the international bank group that negotiated the extension of the short-term debt of the Korean banking system. In early 1999, at the request of the government of Brazil, he acted as worldwide coordinator to help implement the maintenance of trade and interbank lines by foreign commercial banks to Brazil.
'I have been through so many crises, and you get a feel for these warning signs that are there.
'My concern was that it was going to lead directly to a recession and that, unfortunately, is where we are today. There was a tremendous over-leveraging of the system based on cheap credit and a drop by some in standards in lending and investing,' he says of his early warning of a bubble in late 2006.


Frustrated, Mr Rhodes penned an editorial for the Financial Times in March 2007 - the first of several as the sub-prime crisis developed. The article carried a 'Market Warning' tag in bold red. In it, he wrote: 'What is clear to me is that in the next year a material correction in the markets will occur.'

The problem, he says, was that most people were lulled into a false sense of comfort. 'People saw the bubble building up but they felt that there was more time before it burst. One of the things Paul Volcker taught me was that when you are approaching a problem or a crisis, the clock is always running against you and so you have to try to get out in front of the problem. What happened here was that people thought they had more time and they felt that this was something that was not going to hit for another year or two. So in a sense, they saw the warning signs, understood that we were in a bubble, but thought that there was time to handle it. I think that view was shared not just among those in the private sector but also by many in the public sector.''Singapore is in a very strong position going forward because you have very strong political leadership, you have a strong economic team."

It was something all too familiar to Mr Rhodes. Back in the 1990s, he had also sounded warnings of a financial crisis in Asia, only to be told his experience was in Latin America, and that the high savings rate in Asia and Asian values would prevent a crisis in the region.

Lack of urgency

'How do you know when to take steps when there is a bubble? When people start having too much to drink from the punch bowl at a party, you just take the punch bowl away. On the whole, that was what didn't happen this time. People thought they had more time.'

But time finally ran out in August 2007, when sub-prime problems started to hit banks and markets badly worldwide, which led the US Fed, the European Central Bank and other central banks to pump liquidity into the system to stabilise the situation. Again, Mr Rhodes warned at the time that worse was to come.

'I think one of the problems in this process was that most financial institutions did not see the need to raise capital, and one of the things we did correctly (at Citigroup) was that we started raising capital in November 2007. We raised US$50 billion in the first half of this year, including funds from GIC and from the Middle East. We saw that this was going to be a major problem and that we needed to raise capital early.'

And true to Mr Rhodes' prediction of more trouble, Bear Stearns collapsed in March 2008.
'The period after Bear Stearns is what I refer to as a false dawn. There was a bailout arrangement between the Fed and JPMorgan and after that, the Fed gave investment banks and brokerage houses access to the Fed window, so the perception was that the financial problem was basically over. I remember sitting in a meeting in the beginning of May with a number of CEOs and one of them mentioned that the financial problems were largely controlled. I had to disagree with that.'

In an FT piece in May 2008, Mr Rhodes argued that the US economy was still in need of urgent action. 'I said you need public funds to put a floor under housing which wasn't very popular with the administration at that time. 'There was a perception that things were getting back to normal but they really weren't. All you had to do was to see that the interbank lending had not returned to normal, the counterparty risks were very high and that Libor was actually rising.'

He saw another blow-up coming and that was exactly what happened next, with the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 'In September, I was giving a speech in Vienna at the opening of the Swift (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) conference, with 2,000-3,000 people in the audience. I told them that rather than the storm calming down, I though that we were entering the eye of the storm... People thought I was being too pessimistic. And then several days later, Lehman Brothers went into bankruptcy. 'The concern in the market place worsened because Lehman Brothers was so interlinked with the markets worldwide.'

Convinced that more had to be done, Mr Rhodes called for an RTC-type solution (the Resolution Trust Corporation, set up to take over failing US savings institutions in 1989) in another article in the FT. Two weeks later, the US announced the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), a US$700 billion financial lifeline to take over distressed assets from banks. He also urged the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to intervene to help emerging countries fend off the financial crisis, and for the US Fed to enter into swap agreements with key countries to provide liquidity to corporates. Arguing that too much of the emphasis was on the developed countries while emerging market nations were being ignored, he predicted that the crisis was going to spread very quickly to the emerging markets, and debunked the notion - popular in some circles - that developing markets have decoupled from the advanced economies.

Subsequently, the IMF announced some US$35 billion in emergency loans to three countries - Iceland, Ukraine and Hungary - and said it would extend up to US$100 billion more in short-term loans to developing countries that have been hit hard by the financial crisis but are sound economically, with no conditions attached. The Fed also set up a series of swap agreements, including with Singapore and one with South Korea, which Mr Rhodes helped to put together.

More pain ahead

Mr Rhodes warns that there will be more pain before the world gets out of the crisis, and problems in the US will have a significant impact on the economies of Europe, Japan, Asia and South-east Asia.

'The real economy is going to be hit in the US. We had negative growth this last quarter and I think we are going to have substantial negative growth this quarter, and there's a good chance we are going to have negative growth in the first quarter of next year. This will make for three consecutive quarters of negative growth which might make it the worst recession in the US since 1982.

'Although we're probably in the worst global recession we've faced since World War Two, I think the markets are starting to stabilise, and governments are beginning to put major stimulus packages in place. We could still see a second stimulus package in the US in a lame-duck session of the Congress after the elections or at the beginning of the new administration. I think you will see additional measures to work on the foreclosure problems in the US. Once you have a firm floor to housing then you will start to see a recovery.

'I think the consumer in the US is key and since the US started this I think it's very important to stimulate the consumer to come back, and this means finishing the job in housing and getting another stimulus package going.'

He says Singapore is positioned well to get through the recession and may be able to recover early on in the cycle. 'Singapore is in a very strong position going forward because you have very strong political leadership, you have a strong economic team, you have made tremendous advances in technology, in pharmaceuticals. You have excellent infrastructure here and very high education levels. You have so many of the positives here. In addition, you have strong savings, probably the strongest savings situation in Asia.

'It is necessary to bring the consumer back in the countries Singapore exports to. If you ask me how long it'll take, I would say that the US economy should start turning around by the end of next year. I advise governments that when you face a problem like this, you just put in all the stimulus you need, and you can solve the inflationary issues afterwards.

'What you need to do is to create positives and you must restore consumer confidence so that consumers start buying. So confidence is key. That restores interbank lending, and that restores the purchasing power of consumers. It's all confidence at the end of the day.'

Coordinated action among countries and central banks will also be important so that no one will be able to arbritrage one market against another. 'All of this requires leadership, courage and a sense of timing.'

But it's not all gloom and doom, and Mr Rhodes says the crisis also presents opportunities. 'I'm a believer in the Chinese saying weiji, or crisis and opportunity. For Singapore, these difficult times present opportunities and that's the way Singapore needs to look at this.'

For one, a wave of banking merger and acquisitions in Asia and around the world is likely, as the adverse economic conditions force institutions to consolidate and seek economies of scale.

Putting things right

The crisis also offers a good opportunity to learn lessons and to put things right. 'One of the unfortunate things is that after each crisis, people say 'we've learned the lessons and won't allow this to happen again' but the problem is that a couple of years go by and people forget the lessons.'

That's why changes must be made immediately, he says. And a crisis allows you to take tough steps that might not be possible in normal times. 'One of the things we need to do is to have international accounting standards. Right now, you have an International Accounting Standards Board in the UK which much of the world follows. But others have their own standards, including the US. So we must make sure we have similar accounting standards because otherwise, it's going to be very difficult to understand balance sheets and have the transparency you need,' he says.

'Second, I think regulators worldwide have to agree on a set of regulatory norms so again you won't have individual countries arbitraging against each other on regulatory norms. We are in a globalised world and we now see there isn't any decoupling because markets are so tied in one with the other. 'One thing that needs to come out of this is to make sure that, as much as possible, there is some sort of an early warning system.'

He also sees a move towards more centralised regulatory regimes. The likely model could be that in the UK, where there is one regulator for all financial institutions, to fulfil the need for a more centralised regulatory process. 'One of the things we have to be very careful about is that we don't have over-regulation. You need what I like to call smart regulation. So there's a happy median here and what you need is smart regulation, not over-regulation.'

For banks and bankers, this will be a sobering time of self-reflection. Banks and financial institutions will have to review their risk management mechanisms, and it is also important for them to seek views from outside the institution.

'You need to go back to basics, and good risk management is one of them. And if you see problems arise, do something about it in a timely fashion and learn from your mistakes.'

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WILLIAM RHODES
Citigroup senior vice-chairmanCitibank chairman, president and CEO
1957: Joined Citibank after graduating from Brown University
1977: Appointed head of Latin American corporate business
1980s-1990s: Headed the advisory committees of international banks that negotiated debt-restructuring agreements for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay
1991: Named director and vice-chairman
1998: Chaired the international bank group that negotiated the extension of short-term debt of the Korean banking system
1999: Worldwide coordinator implementing the maintenance of trade and interbank lines by foreign commercial banks to Brazil
2007: Donated US$10m to Brown University for the establishment of the Rhodes Center for International Economics at the Watson Institute

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Tuesday, November 4, 2008

Of LTCM and LOR...

Dad and Mum, got back my equity derivatives midterm today. I did well. So, don't worry, I'm not wasting your $$$ here. Hahaha! Anyway, been wanting to blog down one lesson I learnt from the market crashes of 1987 and 1998. Being a lazy bum, I'm just gonna post my answer to one of the midterm questions.

Zhaobin and David: Thanks so much for understanding when I had to cancel my trip to Penn because of this damn midterm. My good grade in this goes out to you dudes! Booyah! =) Good luck for applications! You guys deserve the good stuff.

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What can we learn from the experiences of LOR during 1987 and LTCM in 1998 about the behaviour of strategies that depended on liquidity during periods of market stress? Have other hedge funds experienced similar outcomes in the past 2 months? Be as specific as you can.

Strategies that depend heavily on liquidity during periods of market stress have shown to spark a vicious cycle of asset sell-offs and declining asset prices in the face of market illiquidity. Both LOR and LTCM were pioneers in the strategies they promoted to clients and investors respectively. While based on academically sound assumptions, it was recognized that both strategies required liquid markets to function properly. However, the issue of liquidity (or rather, the lack of it) was swept under the carpet as everyone was eagerly amassing fortunes through these “sexy” ideas. Unsurprisingly, their continued profitability soon attracted competitors who were eager to grab a slice of the pie.

Numerous firms running portfolio insurance programs utilized the same type of dynamic hedging strategies used by LOR, albeit with different clients. In LTCM’s case, hedge funds were set up to replicate their trading strategies, taking up identical positions as the revered fund. Both strategies were severely tested when faced with a plunge in investor confidence due to various events. The downturn in the market required portfolio insurers to short more futures in order to dynamically create a hedge against the drop in markets; while hedge funds in the vein of LTCM were required to stomach losses on a daily basis which led to them liquidating their positions in order to satisfy fund redemptions or settle the losses on their trades.

If one small portfolio uses a particular strategy, liquidity would not be an issue. However, there were many portfolio insurers and LTCM-like funds. Upon having to liquidate, they all had to offer lower prices in order to attract buyers. This resulted in potential liquidity suppliers (buyers) and investors being scared off by the higher volatility and wider spreads. When perceptions change, liquidity evaporates quickly. Indeed, the belief that one can safely get out of a “liquid” market is one of the great fallacies of investing.

This lesson went unlearnt. Banks like Citigroup and Merrill Lynch felt comfortable owning mortgage securities not because they knew anything about the underlying properties, but because the market for mortgages was supposedly “liquid.” (Each firm went on to write down the value of its mortgage investments by more than $40 billion)

More recently, illiquidity found a new victim in US hedgefund Ospraie Management LLC. Ospraie suffered due to a market sell-off and closed its flagship fund after suffering 38.59% losses this year. In a letter sent to investors the fund’s management said that the losses were primarily caused by a substantial selloff in a number of their energy, mining and resource equity holdings during a six-week period characterized by some of the sharpest declines in these sectors in the past ten to twenty years.

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Friday, October 31, 2008

Of the new Don Corleone...

An article was published today about JPM promising to "stall foreclosures for the next 90 days while it finds ways to make payments easier on $110 billion of problem mortgages." They have "decided to examine loans and may agree to reduce interest rates or principal amounts." I guess something is being done for distressed homeowners.

Charlie Scharf, CEO of JPM's Retail Financial Services said JPM felt it was their responsibility to provide additional help to homeowners during these challenging times. He added that JPM will work with families who want to save their homes but are struggling to make their payments. In fact, JPM will hire 300 loan counselors to help delinquent homeowners and employ about 150 people to review each mortgage before it's sent to the foreclosure process (not much assurance there huh?).

Anyway, before we go all warm and fuzzy thinking "Awww.. Wall Street cares..." - check out this other article. Basically, a journalist managed to listen in on a conference call where a JPM executive was commenting on the recent cash injection and tightening of credit. Now, the dirty little secret of the banking industry is out. It had no intention of using the money to make new loans. (Notice that the recent JPM announcement came after this article was released.. I smell PR at work)

Banking executives should remember Don Corleone's advice that one should never let anyone outside the family know what one is thinking. JPM might have saved some themselves some blushes with a good execution of PR101 - but the cat is out of the bag. The orgy of banking M&As will be under greater scrutiny and I expect regulators to be more insistent on seeing an increase in credit extension by the banks. The dumbass might have just stuck a spanner into Jamie Dimon's plans.

Whilst the executive's stupidity probably saved regulators from potential backlash, homeowners should not rejoice yet. In JPM's latest press release, no commitment was given with regard to the restructuring of homeloans moving forward. All that was said was that JPM has decided to look into it over the next 90 days. When 90 days are up, the "loan counsellors" can still tell the homeowners that they're screwed and well, that would be it. Actually, upon greater examination of their choice of words, I get the feeling that the shit has yet to hit the fan. But maybe I'm just overanalysing things.

Nonetheless, we will know 90 days later. Somehow, I can imagine Jamie Dimon telling the homeowners, "Its nothing personal, Sonny. It's strictly business." Dimon is one tough cookie - even LTCM had to cower to him.

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Tuesday, October 28, 2008

Of banking...

Banking used to be the nuts for SMU students (myself included). I guess its time to usher in a new world order. Times are tough, people are getting laid off. IB? I hear "Bank Holding Companies" instead. I wish my friends applying for banking internships the best of luck. I know they're good - they're damn bloody good. But this time, being good just ain't gonna be enough. It's down to a roll of the dice. Where's my place in all the madness?

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Thursday, October 23, 2008

Anyone with insight?

We know governments are stepping up their game. Capital has been issued to help strengthen balance sheets all over the shop. So, maybe we don't have to fear a bank run. Interest rates are being slashed all over as if Freddie from Elm Street was in charge of global monetary policies. So maybe we don't need to fear a liquidity crisis. Investment Banks have morphed into Bank Holding Structures. Ok, so maybe we don't have to fear Lehman part 2.

But what exactly is being done to the home mortgages that are really squeezing the shit out of the homeowners? This is a fundamental problem that I rarely hear being addressed in the news. If anyone knows, please let me know. It's such a big issue, and for various reasons, I strongly believe that if this isn't looked into properly, there's a higher chance that we might see the onset of a prolonged economic (not financial) crisis. And that's what really sucks.

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